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1. INTRODUCTION.
The aim of this essay is to discuss a feasible process of transition to external 
convertibility for the Soviet rouble. In recent Soviet economic literature there has been a 
lively debate on this issue, and the Soviet leadership has also given it serious attention 2. 
However, many of the points discussed still remain rather confused and the long-term 
strategy of the Soviet leadership has, as yet, not been disclosed.
This paper is based on some assumptions, which, due to the narrow limits of the 
paper itself, will only be outlined briefly here. First, it is assumed that a positive 
correlation exists between central planning, bilateralism and inconvertibility: the 
convertibility issue arises when a planned economy moves from a strictly controlled 
system of planning and management to a more decentralized one. Second, a necessary 
condition for the introduction of meaningful convertibility is the positive development
1. Paper prepared for the 1989 NATO Economics Colloquium "Soviet economic reforms: 
implementation under wav'1 2Brussels, March 15th-17th, 1989. Financial support from the EUI for a 
research visit to the Soviet Union in January 1989 is gratefully acknowledged. In writing the paper I 
have benefitted enormously from daily discussions and previous work on similar topics with Efisio 
Espa, as well as suggestions and useful comments by Alberto Chilosi, Sheila Mamie, Mario Nuti and 
Fabio Sdogati. However, they should not be held responsible for mistakes or lack of clarity.
2. To the best of my knowledge, the possibility of introducing convertibility was first officially 
mentioned at the June 1987 Meeting of the Central Committee, where it was presented as a long-term 
objective. Subsequently, Prime Minister N. Ryzhkov at the forty-third session of the CMEA spoke 
about Soviet support to "the accord of the majority of countries on the introduction of the mutual 
convertibility of national currencies and the transferable rouble for servicing direct production links, 





























































































of economic reforms, both of the domestic economy and the external sector. Finally, 
currency liberalization goes hand in hand with trade liberalization. The process, 
however, must not happen too quickly: opening up must be gradual and long-term.
The paper is organized as follows:
The characteristics of three different systems of planning and management (the 
centrally planned economy, the modified planned economy and the reformed planned 
economy) are briefly outlined. The recent developments of the reform process in the 
USSR and its likely development are judged against this analytical framework. There is 
a brief discussion of the convertibility concept, after which a feasible path of transition 
to convertibility for the Soviet economy is outlined. Two scenarios are sketched: the 
first examines the transition process to regional convertibility; the second tries to figure 
out a possible way of reaching a worldwide form. Finally, the possibility of bringing 
about external convertibility of the Soviet rouble is assessed: preconditions and 
obstacles, as well as the pros and cons of regional versus worldwide convertibility are 
considered. Brief concluding remarks summarise the main findings of the paper.
1. REFORMS, PLANNING AND CONVERTIBILITY.
In a recent article in Economic Policy, D. M. Nuti introduces a taxonomy of the 
reform process which distinguishes between a centrally planned economy (CPE), a 
modified planned economy (MPE) and a reformed planned economy (RPE). This will 
be adopted for our analysis 2. In fact, the Soviet economy presented, up to the first half 
of the 1980s, all the features of a classic centrally planned economy (also defined by 
Berliner as a "documonetary" economy). The process of reform initiated thereafter has 
modified many of these characteristics, although an important part of the system of 
planning and management remains unchanged.
a. Foreign trade and convertibility in the "documonetary" economy.
In the economic literature, CPEs in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, 
have been treated mainly as closed, semi-autarkic economies. The characteristics of the 
centralized system of planning seem to indicate, in fact, a substantial lack of openness in 
the sense of direct and automatic exposure to trade competition. In the particular 
environment of a classic CPE, where all the relations between variables have to be 
defined in advance, trade introduces uncertainty into the planning process and makes the 
domestic economy subject to external fluctuations. According to standard theory 4 the 
level of trade of a CPE is mainly determined by import requirements: exports are 
considered a "necessary evil" to procure imports. In other words the quantity-oriented 
nature of the centralized system tends to limit risks by minimizing dependence on *4
2. Cf. Nuti (1988).




























































































outside suppliers, even for products that could be acquired more economically abroad. It 
has further been suggested that the centralized system tends to prevent full exploitation 
of the comparative advantages and participation in the international division of labour. 
There is a trade-off between minimizing the risks involved in trade and complete 
exploitation of the advantages deriving from participation in international trade.
On the financial side, the main characteristic of the Soviet economy is the well 
known external inconvertibility of the rouble 5, its role as purely domestic currency. A 
domestic capital market is absent and the Soviet authorities do not intervene to support 
an official parity in the foreign exchange market. The only function exercised by the 
exchange rate is that of converting prices in foreign currencies into domestic prices for 
Balance of Payments purposes.
The main consequence of inconvertibility is the large amount of trade that takes 
place on the basis of bilateral agreements. This does not involve money settlement and 
prices tend to be specially negotiated. In bilateral trade with other centrally planned 
economies prices used are supposed to reflect world prices, while intra-CMEA trade 
prices are now adjusted annually on the basis of "world" averages from the preceding 
five years.
Four features of the financial system regulating foreign trade are worth stressing.
First, the rouble does not link domestic to world prices and the structure of 
domestic prices can and does diverge sharply from that of foreign trade prices. The 
Foreign Trade Organization pays the Soviet suppliers and charges Soviet purchasers 
appropriate wholesale prices, in such a way that the domestic operator never has foreign 
currency at his disposal. With the use of a price equalization mechanism, the wide 
disparity between domestic and valuta prices is adjusted via the state budget. Broadly 
speaking, from the microeconomic point of view, there are no price differences for firms 
whether they sell abroad or on the domestic market 5.
Second, there is no uniform criterion for determining the efficiency of foreign 
trade. Owing to the fact that the prices used do not reflect the desirability of a given 
transaction, the methodology for calculating the effectiveness of foreign trade is, as 
often happens in Soviet practice, based entirely on "engineering" rules, rather than on an 
evaluation of costs and benefits. Very briefly, the methodology for calculating the 
economic effectiveness of foreign trade is based, for exports, on a comparison of valuta 
earnings with costs in roubles, adjusted with a corrective coefficient to compensate for 
the inadequacy of internal prices. Imports are compared with analogous goods or with 
the cost of goods exported to pay imports (although it is almost impossible to identify 
which goods are exported). On the one hand this procedure has allowed domestic prices
5. The rouble was removed from international quotations in 1926.
6. In reality a system of incentive markups (nadbavkil on the wholesale prices operates with 
controversial results. A decree of 1985 - Postanovlenie n. 699,12/7/1985 - established a surcharge of 
up to 20% of the wholesale price for deliveries of machinery and equipment exports to the convertible 




























































































to be insulated from variations taking place on the external market, but on the other 
hand it is the cause of important time lags in the transmission of world market signals.
Third, the system offers few incentives to boost exports and to rationalize 
imports. With regard to domestic sources of supply, the central authorities face strong 
pressure from below (i.e. branch, Ministries, enterprises) for additional imports, 
especially for producer goods. This is in part the outcome of problems which often 
characterize a CPE, such as the positive correlation of incentives with volume and/or 
gross value of output and the lack of penalties correlated with the costs of production, 
which leads to an "unlimited" demand for resources, or to preference being given to 
investment as opposed to innovation. At the same time imports depend not only on the 
presence of a shortage, but also on the degree of priority given to the shortage product. 
Planners also face export constraints from below, in so far as special bonuses for exports 
are not sufficient to make production for the foreign market attractive. In particular 
costs connected with the improvement of quality, delivery and servicing of exports are 
higher than the gains assured by the incentive system.
Fourth, in many respects the rouble is not fully convertible into goods even 
within the USSR. Money alone is not sufficient, outside the retail sector, and in some 
cases even within it, to provide a claim on available goods; a document (plan allocation) 
is also needed.
b. The role o f the external sector in the MPE.
The Soviet economy can no longer be described as rigidly centrally planned, 
since a more decentralized system is being built up. Schematically, the new system is 
characterized by a substantial improvement in planning and management, with increased 
individual responsibility for the results obtained, greater enterprise autonomy, and 
encouragement of various forms of private enterprise. A large part of production is 
however still subject to direct control, through state orders (Goszakazy)-, prices in the 
consumer markets are fixed administratively, and resources are only partially allocated 
through the market.
The reorganization of the foreign trade sector has granted some enterprises the 
right to operate directly on the foreign market, i.e. without the mediation of the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and Foreign Trade Organizations 2. Many Soviet economists maintain 
that the final aim of the reform is a dramatic transformation of the nature of foreign 
trade operations: the complete abolition of trade and currency monopoly and the 
introduction of trade in foreign currency based on a unified and realistic exchange rate.
Since January 1987, twenty Ministries and about seventy associations and 
enterprises have been able to import and export without the preliminary authorization by 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade (now the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations). 
Subsequently, the right has been extended to a larger number of economic organizations 
(about 150 at the end of 1988) and, from April 1989, it will apply to all economic units





























































































"whose output is competitive on the foreign market" S. The enterprises which cannot 
enter directly the external market, can utilize specialized foreign trade organizations, 
which, however, will no longer be a branch of the Ministry, but specialized firms 
carrying out these operations with the necessary expertise.
These enterprises are also authorized to retain and use part of the hard currency 
they earn, which is deposited in a special fund. However, the way in which the fund is 
managed by the Vneshnekonbank (the bank for foreign economic relations) has given 
rise to criticism. In fact, it has so far remained in a special account at the 
Vneshnekonbank during the fiscal year; the bank authorized the use of funds collected 
by the enterprises in 1987 only from April 1988, even though the recent Decree called 
for an immediate allocation of the funds 2. Major criticism is also directed at the great 
variability of the retention percentage applied (from 2% to 80% of currency earned 
according to products), and the lack of possibility to transfer funds between enterprises. 
As a result only half of the funds are actually utilized by firms 10.
The reform has also attempted to increase exposure to international prices, by 
introducing some forms of shadow prices (differentiated currency coefficients - DVK 
differenzirovannye valutnye koeffitsienty). In theory, with the use of the ex-ante 
coefficients the product bought or sold is no longer accounted for using the domestic 
wholesale price, but directly from the contractual price on the foreign market. 
Coefficients are differentiated according to imports and expons, geographical 
distribution of trade and type of product U . However, a number of articles have recently 
appeared in the Soviet press pointing out serious shortcomings in the coefficients 12. 
According to many authors, coefficients do not fulfil their function of stimulating export 
and rationalizing imports. They do not provide the unique and stable criterion necessary 
to determine the macroeconomic efficiency of foreign trade and conflict with the 
implementation of self-financing and financial autonomy of the enterprise at domestic 
level. It follows that imports and exports are still mainly determined at the central level 
and the coefficients are adjusted in order to ensure profitability for the enterprise: they 
are maintained whenever this is profitable for the enterprises, and substituted with the 
usual instrument of price-equalization in most others.
The Soviet leadership has recently announced that a unified exchange rate will 
be introduced by 1991. The December 1988 Decree states, among other things, the 
intention to introduce a realistic exchange rate for the rouble, as well as a devaluation of 
50% to be carried out in 1990. The decree is rather confused on this point, but the 
rationale seems to be the following. The substitution of the thousand of DVKs with a
§. Cf. Postanovlenie (1988), art.2.
2. Cf. Postanovlenie (1988), art.14.
JO. On the specific problems concerning the currency funds of enterprises, see Zverev (1987).
11. The number of coefficients is unclear, but there are certainly more than 3,000. They range from 
0.2 to 6.6. Astrakhantseva-Kuznetsov (1988).
12. Cf. Antonov (1988); Doronin (1988), esp. part I; Golovaty-Antonov (1988); Shyrkalin (1988); 




























































































unified exchange rate will be achieved through the introduction of a 100% import 
surcharge (nadbavka) and export premium, which, however, will not apply to raw 
materials, energy, centralized supplies, nor to tourism. It is not yet clear whether the 
devaluation is to be applied to joint ventures 12.
The introduction of a tariff system as an indirect way of regulating imports and 
stimulating exports and of closing the gap between internal and foreign trade prices, is 
also announced in the 1988 decree, which expressly states that those measures are seen 
as strengthening "the basis for international commercial negotiations with the GATT 
and EEC" M.
What seems to be missing in the debate among Soviet economists and policy­
makers is the evolution of targets and instruments of economic policy which must 
parallel the decentralization process. In fact, the transition from one system to the other 
requires dramatic shifts in the choice of both targets and instruments of economic 
policy. In the classic CPE, policy intervention is essentially carried out through direct 
and selective controls of import and export flows, monopoly of Foreign Trade 
Organizations (FTO), etc. The price-equalization mechanism (import taxes and export 
subsidies) allows the differential domestic-foreign prices to be maintained and 
(theoretically) insulates the domestic economy from external fluctuations. In other 
words the planner, instead of promoting a microeconomic relationship between internal 
and external prices using one or more exchange rates, allows only a macroeconomic 
link, through the state budget. Thus, the exchange rate as an instrument for maintaining 
external balance is in many respects redundant; and this explains, at least partially, the 
possibility of maintaining dramatic overvaluation of the official rate in many CPEs.
When decentralization of the decision-making process takes place, the exchange 
rate not only regains economic significance, but becomes an essential instrument of 
economic policy. The coexistence of indicative and normative planning (and the 
increasing transformation of the first into the second) takes place during the transition 
period, when some objectives of economic policy (e.g. quantity of money in circulation, 
credit supply, etc.) can be managed almost exclusively through the use of the "new" 
instruments, others, like aggregate demand, may be influenced by direct and indirect 
ones.
12. A detailed assessment of the effects the new measures will have on the rouble exchange rate can 
be found in Lavigne (1988).




























































































C. RADIKALNAYA REFORMA AND EXTERNAL CONVERTIBILITY OF THE 
ROUBLE.
Until now, the Soviet economy has not undertaken a complete reorganization of 
the system of planning, even though there are signs which indicate the willingness of the 
Soviet leadership to proceed in this direction.
Theoretically, a reformed planned economy is characterized by the following 
features 15:
i) the dismantling of central planning: strategic decisions are still taken at the 
central level, but instead of administrative orders, enterprises receive only guidelines; 
the system of direct allocation of resources is substituted by wholesale trade between 
economic units;
ii) a reduction in the number of Ministries, and more generally a reorganization 
of the bureaucratic apparatus;
iii) the free movement of firms into different sectors, assuming that they 
maintain production in their original one;
iv) a reorganization of the banking system with a clear separation of the 
functions between central and commercial banks. The central bank has only the function 
of control and direction, while there is competition between commercial banks;
v) a greater availability and variety of financial assets; enterprises can re-invest 
part of their profits, interest-bearing and performance-linked bonds appear, as well as 
trading of financial assets on a secondary market;
vi) some market-based valuation of enterprises takes place.
It is clear that in this environment all obstacles to commodity convertibility are 
removed, and some form of external convertibility is introduced.
2. DEFINITION, ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF CONVERTIBILITY.
a. Meaning o f convertibility.
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund, a currency is 
considered convertible if it meets three criteria 15:
i) if it can be used without restrictions of a currency character for any reason 
whatsoever;
ii) if it can be exchanged for any other currency without restrictions of a 
currency character;
iii) if it can be used or exchanged at its par value, or at a rate of exchange based 
on the par value, or at some legal rate of exchange defined in any other way considered 
desirable.
15. Cf. Nuti (1988), esp. pp. 377-384, and Nuti-Sengupta (1988). 




























































































In other words, under Article VIII, sections 2,3 and 4, IMF members are obliged 
to avoid restrictions on current international transactions, multiple currency practice and 
discriminatory currency arrangements. Moreover, the monetary authorities of a member 
country must convert balances of their currency when those balances are presented for 
conversion by the monetary authority of another member 12.
In reality, once the member has accepted the obligations of Article VIII, 
derogatory norms can be introduced and the member may impose restrictions of several 
kinds. It follows that various degrees of convertibility can be identified, by the 
effectiveness of exchange controls and restrictions, quantitative and financial barriers to 
external transactions, etc.
With regard to planned economies, an important distinction has been introduced 
in the relevant literature between commodity and financial convertibility IS.
While financial convertibility is identified with the possibility of changing a 
currency into any other at the exchange rate prevailing in the market, according to J. 
Van Brabant, commodity convertibility "means that the holder of a currency is entitled 
to purchase any desired goods or services at prevailing price in the currency’s home 
market" 12.
Forms of purely financial convertibility for the socialist currencies were 
originally advocated by Wiles, who, given the substantial stability of the transferable 
rouble at the beginning of the 1970s, proposed transforming it into a reserve asset. The 
idea reflected at the same time the widespread feeling among Western economists that 
in a planned economy commodity convertibility would be more difficult to achieve than 
currency convertibility 2Q. However, as I will try to argue below, there is not much sense 
in proposing forms of financial convertibility (outside capital transactions) in an 
economy still strictly regulated by central planning.
Soviet economists have so far proposed limited forms of convertibility, mainly 
on the current account. Aganbegyan speaks of internal convertibility as the 
"establishment of a rate for the rouble and other currencies according to which 
enterprises and other organizations could exchange the rouble for foreign currency, and 
some currency earned from the export of goods and services could be exchanged into
12. ibid., p.58.
i§ . This distinction has been discussed, sometimes with a slightly different terminology, by, among 
others, Altman (1960), Wiles (1973), Wilczynski (1980), Holzman (1987), Brabant (1977) and (1987).
12. Brabant (1987), pp.366-367. Obviously, the possibility to enter the local market first has to be 
granted to non-residents.
2Q. Different expressions of this limited form of convertibility have been repeatedly proposed in the 
literature. For instance, the possibility of establishing a convertible rouble backed by gold, a sort of 
premium market for gold in the form of rouble, was first proposed by Allman - Altman (1960), p. 
428. More recently, Wilczynski has suggested forms of guaranteed convertibility to non-residents into 
gold bullion or hard currency, without free access to the Soviet market - Wilczynski (1980), p.474. 
Finally, a proposal has been advanced of making the rouble convertible at an exchange rate pegged to 




























































































roubles" 21. Doronin defines the rouble’s internal convertibility as "a form of 
distributing currency resources for enterprises and organizations" 22, while Kuznetsov 
suggests creating an exchange market restricted to residents, along the lines of other 
Eastern European countries 23.
b. Advantages and drawbacks o f convertibility.
The process of transition to convertibility, identified basically with overcoming 
goods inconvertibility and introducing a form of free exchange of foreign currencies, 
has its costs. First the possibility of speculation on international markets cannot be ruled 
out. This would be particularly disruptive for a CPE, with its scarce currency reserve 
and the difficulty of drawing up and administering domestic monetary and fiscal 
policies. The increased degree of openness exposes the domestic economy to shocks 
from the international market. Moreover, as is often argued in the literature 24, trade 
diversion effects are possible. The trade reorientation that took place at the end of the 
Second World War towards the Soviet Union, may be reversed once the artificial 
barriers against the rest of the world are removed. Furthermore, the CPEs might transfer 
part of their chronic excess demand to the external sector.
On the other hand, the introduction of external convertibility presents obvious 
advantages. First of all, the benefits of a multilateral trade regime. The substitution of 
multiple exchange rates with a simplified (and realistic) one gives the planner a unique 
macroeconomic criterion with which to judge the foreign trade performance of the 
economy, as well as a new, powerful instrument of economic policy. The substitution of 
directive and selective controls with a new tariff system (as well as the end of price 
equalization mechanisms) could be a first step towards participation in international 
organizations like GATT and IMF. At the microeconomic level, exposure to foreign 
competition should improve efficiency and stimulate domestic competitiveness as well.
Controversial opinions can be found in the literature about the possibility of 
seignorage, i.e. the advantages accruing to a country whose currency is used in 
international transactions. According to Holzman 25, seignorage for a convertible rouble 
might be negative: the currency will be used only as a store of value, thus a positive 
interest rate must be paid in order to convince people to hold it. However, if one 
considers the CMEA as a preferential trading area, the convertible rouble could be used 
as a mean of payment, with functions similar to those performed by the dollar during the 
1960s in the West. Moreover, for seignorage to be negative the interest rate would have 
to be higher than the marginal cost of external finance to the USSR.
21. Aganbegyan (1988), p.155.
22. Doronin (1988), p.38.
22. Kuznetsov (1988a).
24. Cf. for instance Csaba (1983).




























































































3. THE ROAD TO CONVERTIBILITY 26.
The aim of this section is to outline a feasible path to convertibility, both within 
the CMEA and with respect to Western currencies, for a CPE bearing many of the 
characteristics of the Soviet economy. Two separate theoretical scenarios are described, 
one concerning the way convertibility may be reached within the CMEA, the other the 
transition to a more generalized form 22. The distinction is useful in order to outline 
more clearly both the advantages and drawbacks involved in the decision to move 
towards a more liberalized system. However, the two processes are not mutually 
exclusive and enlarged convertibility should not be interpreted as being strictly 
dependent on the attainment of regional convertibility. On the contrary, the two 
processes may develop in parallel, even though, as I shall try to argue below, there are 
necessary preconditions which need to be fulfilled in order to make the whole process 
feasible.
a. Convertibility within the CMEA.
i) As a first move towards liberalization some enterprises are granted the right to 
import and export without the preliminary authorization of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade. Firms are also authorized to retain part of the earned currency to be used, within 
certain limits, for purchases abroad.
Three different mechanisms of currency allocation may be envisaged: i) direct 
allocation by the Central Bank; ii) competitive bids for currency, administered by the 
Central Bank itself, in which the price is determined on the basis of supply and demand; 
iii) a currency exchange between enterprises at contractual prices.
At this stage, both the use of national currencies and the transferable rouble are 
possible. In the former case firms retain foreign currency (according to technical 
specifications to be defined) with the possibility of using it at a later date; in the latter 
case the transferable rouble assumes a connotation of actually transferable currency, 
granting firms a purchasing power within the area 28.
2S. This section draws heavily on Daviddi-Espa (1989b), where many of the arguments sketched 
below are more fully developed.
22. The two scenarios arc built on the historical experience of transition to multilateral trade and 
convertibility of Western European countries after the Second World War. There are obvious 
historical and institutional differences, which, however, do not make it unreasonable to take that 
process as a guideline. A more detailed analysis of the relevance of the Western European transition to 
convertibility for the East European CPEs is developed in Daviddi-Espa (1989a).
28. This purchasing power finds its limits in the amount of domestic goods which is available above 




























































































Since foreign trade is no longer strictly regulated according to ex-ante bilateral 
agreements and a number of enterprises operate directly on foreign markets, the 
possibility of disequilibrium increases 22. The usual instruments at a planner’s disposal 
(direct reduction of imports) can be paralleled and gradually substituted by more 
indirect ones (subsidies to exporting industries, taxes and incentives; tariffs and quotas) 
22.
The exchange rate(s) slowly changes from being a totally passive tool, mainly 
used for aggregating trade flows, to a more meaningful instrument of economic policy. 
For this to occur, a reduction in the number of exchange rates and coefficients has to 
take place, or even the introduction of a unique rate, or at least of a dual rate with a 
distinction between planned and unplanned transactions. The prices determined by the 
currency bids and the exchange of surpluses between enterprises may give some 
indication, albeit for the moment only approximate, of a more realistic parity.
A further step is signalled by an attempt to overcome the bilateral clearing 
system prevailing within the CMEA 21. A regime of effective multilateralization within 
the CMEA could be reached simply through the enhancement of the role of the 
International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) and the creation of effective 
mechanisms of monetary compensation. The main obstacle to the creation of a 
mechanism of multilateral clearing through the IBEC, is the utilization of different rates 
of exchange for different transactions with various countries, thus of a different value of 
the transferable rouble in different transactions. In reality there is not just one 
transferable rouble, but many (10-12). The balance has to carried out not only between 
countries, but hard for hard and soft for soft, and very often even according to specific 
commodity groups. It follows that the value of any single transaction differs even within 
trade flows with the same country. This also explains why the attempt in the 1970s to 
balance 10% of surpluses and deficits in hard currency came to nothing 32.
ii) The role of the Central Bank is redefined: the main tasks concerning daily 
operations in foreign currencies are decentralized to commercial banks, while the 
Central Bank still maintains a role of coordination and supervision of this kind of
"mobilize" only limited amounts of goods, besides those already inserted in bilateral agreements and 
consequendy slotted into the overall planning process.
22. In fact, even under a bilateral trade regime there may be imbalances, when plans are in physical 
terms and price formulas make prices move after the plan is drawn and trade agreements signed.
30. It may be supposed that the distortions introduced by these measures are less significant than those 
implied by the stale monopoly of foreign trade, which can be interpreted as a single, gigantic non­
tariff barrier. Moreover, the role played by subsidies, tariffs and quotas can be progressively reduced 
as the process of liberalization advances.
21. CMEA countries have made various attempts to switch to a multilateral trade regime, particularly 
in the 1960s. However, as conclusively demonstrated by Jozef van Brabant, "only an astonishing small 
amount of CMEA trade is being settled multilaterally", Brabant (1987), p. 276. For a complete 
exposition of the issue and relevant references, cf. Brabant (1977), esp. pp. 75-101 and Brabant 
(1987), esp. pp. 269-278.
22. According to Prof. Mazanov, a leading Soviet specialist on CMEA financial issues, the IBEC 




























































































activity. An important instrument of indirect control by the Central Bank is the 
determination of the percentage of hard-currency which any enterprise manages freely.
The Central Bank must build up currency reserves, to be used in the event of the 
exchange rate going through temporary difficulties. In the limited context of intra- 
CMEA convertibility, such a problem should not be too serious for the Soviet Union. 
The rouble would probably be the most widely accepted mean of payments, given the 
predominant role of the USSR in the area.
iii) An exchange rate parity grid among the various socialist currencies may be 
created - a sort of Socialist Monetary System (SMS). The SMS could borrow some of 
the elements of the EMS:
- currency realignment as a response to pressures on the existing parities;
- the possibility for some countries of delaying their participation in the currency 
agreement;
- cooperation between central monetary authorities.
A limited number of commercial banks is authorized to carry out currency 
transactions, including arbitrage (within the narrow limits of fluctuations around fixed 
parities). These operations are for the moment short-term (three, six months). The main 
consequence is that the exchange rate is now partially independent of the supply and 
demand deriving simply from import and export flows.
At this stage the IBEC can play a fundamental role in relation to any unexpected 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments. The mechanism could be similar to those of 
the IMF (creation of a pool of reserve of different currencies, credit concession on main 
currencies only and according to conditionality criteria). Once the criteria for correcting 
a disequilibrium of the balance of payments have been singled out, more automatic 
credit concession may be envisaged.
iv) As the tendencies described above consolidate, the risks of Balance of 
Payments deficits increase, possible currency crises and the necessity of policy 
interventions arise. The quota of trade independent of planning surpasses the planned 
quota (with a parallel increase in the decentralization of the decision-making progress) 
and the number of enterprises allowed to transact with foreign partners outstrips purely 
domestic firms. This exposes the economy to even more pressures from the external 
sector, and makes the use of the "classic" instrument of macroeconomic control 
necessary. The exchange rate thus becomes both a possible source of disturbances and a 
possible instrument for their correction.
b. Convertibility with the rest o f the world.
The process of commercial and monetary liberalization with the rest of the world 
is characterized by problems similar to those already examined in the intra-CMEA 
liberalization. In this case too the main issue is represented by the existence of a trade 
structure based on bilateral agreements, strictly regulated planning of trade flows, and 
currency inconvertibility.
i) In a first phase the CPE would tend to maximize the advantages derived from 
the prevailing bilateral agreements. Since a clearing house for clearing unbalances 




























































































loosen the ties imposed by rigid trade and monetary controls at the firm level. More 
specifically, stocks of hard currencies can be allocated to firms either through a system 
of competitive bids, similar to those indicated above, or through direct allocation by the 
central monetary authorities. A system of licences in the distribution of imported goods 
can act as a substitute for direct allocation. On the other hand, currency management is 
still characterized by a strong degree of centralization and is carried out by the Central 
Bank, which supervises the activity of the authorized commercial banks.
ii) At a later stage, some form of external convertibility of the Soviet rouble may 
be declared. The opening to international quotations raises the problem of deciding 
which exchange rate regime should be adopted. The experience of Western European 
countries has shown that the creation of a monetary agreement among various states 
allows the determination of ratios between currencies on the basis of collective rules, 
rather than on the behaviour of a single country. In the case of socialist countries 
political, as well as economic reasons might suggest pegging in one way or another to 
EMS parities. The more convenient way would be pegging the convertible currency to 
the ECU. This would be also a way to send a "political", as well as economic, message. 
Such a criterion could assure stability of the exchange rate and could give indications of 
the variation in the degree of competitiveness towards the commercial area, which 
presumably will continue to be privileged.
All the above-outlined problems relating to external shocks are still present, and 
it becomes even more important to work out an effective mix of monetary and fiscal 
policy to tackle these. However, the decentralization process of the economy is already 
such that there is now not much difference between the kind of problems (and proposed 
solutions) that would characterize this environment and a market economy with a strong 
state sector. The Central Bank is fully responsible for exchange rate management, an 
essential instrument of economic policy. The accumulation of hard currency reserves is 
crucial to allow greater flexibility in non-residents convertibility. This may take place in 
the usual way: international indebtness in hard currency, trade surpluses, sale of gold 
stocks, and, in the event of participation in the IMF, through the allocation of SDR and 
other financial facilities.
A crucial role may also be played by the IBEC. Countries with a structural 
deficit, or in temporary difficulties, could have access to hard currency credits from the 
IBEC, which could manage all (or more realistically part) of the hard currency pooled 
together by the various socialist Central Banks (Centralized Reserve Fund) 22.
22. The idea behind a unified management of monetary policy at CMEA level might sound utopian 
and premature, particularly in the light of the resistance which CMEA integration has faced in recent 
years. However, as recent proposals at the EEC level testify, an area seeking closer economic and 
monetary integration has to take into account such kind of problems. N. Thygesen - one of four 
outside experts of the Delors Committee of European Community Central Bankers - has recently 
drawn up detailed plans for setting up a European Monetary Policy Committee (EMPC), modelled on 
the US Federal Open Market Committee. Among other things the EMPC would manage dollar and 





























































































iii) The introduction of greater freedom in capital movement, can be considered 
an additional stage 34. Theoretically, there are no more obstacles to a gradual widening 
of the capital market towards Western countries, depending on the success of measures 
which have made convertibility possible. The main problem here is deciding what kind 
of controls should be adopted. It may be supposed that particularly in the first phase of 
the liberalization process, Soviet capital moves in relevant quantities towards more 
profitable areas. Controls may concern both medium and long-term financial investment 
by Soviet residents (firms, cooperatives, etc.) and, to an even greater extent, short-term 
capital movements. The adoption of gradual and selective criteria would seem to be 
appropriate here, as the experience of many Western countries has shown.
4. PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS AND MAIN OBSTACLES TO THE
INTRODUCTION OF CONVERTIBILITY.
Let us try to establish, by looking at concrete Soviet economic constraints, the 
main obstacles to the Soviet economy’s evolution in this direction.
i) Elimination of domestic overhang.
The presence of an enormous monetary overhang in the Soviet domestic 
economy, as extensively argued in a recent article by V. Popov and N. Shmelev 32, 
originates by several factors. The state budget deficit, unofficially estimated around 11% 
of GNP, is now recognized as a factor, among others, dramatically fuelling the 
disequilibrium 36. This overhang, as discussed below, poses serious constraints on 
domestic price reform, as well as on the introduction of external convertibility. Under 
those conditions trade liberalization would lead to a dramatic increase of imports, at any 
exchange rate.
34. Even in the experience of Western countries, capital movements are more widely regulated than 
trade transactions. In the Italian experience, for instance, direct and selective controls on non­
commercial transactions were only abolished at the beginning of 1988.
32. Popov-Shmelev (1988).
32. The official recognition of a budget deficit is a relatively new phenomenon for the Soviet 
economy. It is officially reported at 36.3 billion roubles in 1987. However, according to Soviet 
economists of the Institute for the United States and Canada, this figure does not take into account 
government borrowing from the credit system (over 60 Bn R), direct Government borrowing from the 
population, and budget deficits from the Republics. A recent publication by the CIA estimates the 




























































































ii) Creation of an internal market.
The introduction of a meaningful form of external convertibility is subordinate to 
removing commodity inconvertibility. In other words, as is increasingly recognized by 
Soviet economists, a necessary precondition is the creation of a domestic market. For 
instance, in a recent article published in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, A. Tsimailo argues 
that the introduction of external convertibility of the rouble requires preparation of the 
Soviet domestic market, for integration with the world economy. There cannot be 
complete or even partial convertibility towards foreign currencies without real domestic 
convertibility of money into goods, both in the enterprise and in the consumer sector 22. 
At the moment, about 95% of total import and export flows are still subject to direct 
control. However a gradual transition to wholesale trade in means of production is 
envisaged, and it is estimated that by 1990 around 50% of intermediate goods will be 
exchanged trough the market.
iii) Currency stabilization and establishment of a realistic exchange rate.
The third precondition is the establishment of a realistic exchange rate for the 
rouble. There are at least two main obstacles: the distorted structure of domestic relative 
prices and the gap between domestic and foreign trade prices. A domestic price reform 
has been announced for next year, when a new system of wholesale prices will be 
introduced. However, it may easily be forecasted that even after the price reform 
significant distortions will persist 3§. Furthermore, any proposal of price reform, 
especially of consumer prices, has to take the above-mentioned monetary overhang into 
account. The increase of prices, either once-for-all, or with gradual increases might just 
lead to a deterioration in the living standard of the population, without a substantial 
reduction of the excess demand.
It is generally recognized that at present the exchange rate of the rouble is highly 
overvalued, even though is rather difficult to establish the correct degree of 
overvaluation. However, the technical determination of a meaningful value for the 
exchange rate, once inflationary pressures have been weakened, should not be too 
complex. As already discussed, a system of state controlled auctions would be a first 
step, and there are indications that the Soviet Union is now moving in this direction. 
Other proposals include the creation of a permanent foreign exchange market, with the 
possibility for domestic commercial banks to carry out operations in hard currency 22.
22. Cf. Tsimailo (1989). According to Prof. Shmelev, this kind of convertibility could be achieved in 
five years.
2S. In particular, a recent study by Soviet economists shows that the gap between domestic and 
foreign prices in manufactures might even increase. Cf. Astrakhantseva-Kuznetsov (1988).
22. Cf. Kostantinov (1988). The proposal to build an internal market for foreign currency has also 




























































































iv) Accumulation of currency reserves.
Gold sales already represent a significant source of hard currency revenues 
(estimated at about 15% of total hard currency revenues, i.e. $ 3.5 bn in 1987). The 
USSR possesses large stocks and would presumably be able to slightly increase gold 
sales without a dramatic drop in prices.
In parallel the hard currency debt can be utilized as a source of gross 
accumulation. The Soviet Union has a good credit reputation with Western bankers and 
has in the past been able in the past to obtain favourable conditions.
Finally, should the USSR join the IMF, other funds may be made available from 
the usual financing mechanisms of this organization.
v) Creation of a stock of goods potentially exportable to the world market.
Up to now the Soviet Union has been unable to expand its manufactured product 
export towards Western industrialized countries. The well know problems of quality, 
reliability and servicing of Soviet production have been the main cause, although the 
trade restrictions and quotas imposed by many countries, above all those of the 
European Community have also played a role. Flere, more than in any other sector of the 
Soviet economy, there is ample room for manouvre, in particular if the USSR manages 
to take advantage of collaboration with Western partners (joint ventures, free trade 
zones, etc.). Flowever, it should be taken into account that, as Nuti and Sengupta have 
pointed out, "the export performance of a CPE is a question of restricting absorption to 
make room for export, and not simply a question of "competitiveness" of a kind that 
may be redressed with devaluation” 4Q. In a typical CPE environment devaluation will 
not work; it will merely be inflationary.
5. INTRA-CMEA CONVERTIBILITY VERSUS CONVERTIBILITY AT LARGE: A
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT.
We have seen that convertibility is a proclaimed aim of economic policy, but, as 
yet, Soviet long-term strategy remains unclear. On the one hand official statements seem 
to indicate a possible two-stage approach: first regional and then worldwide 
convertibility; on the other Soviet specialists tend to emphasise the obstacles to such a 
policy and judge more favourably the introduction of an enlarged form of convertibility.
In his speech at the 43rd Session of CMEA, Prime Minister N. Ryzhkov noted: 
"As a promising goal we should have in mind the gradual transfer, as the necessary 
conditions arise, from the mutual convertibility of national currencies to the creation of 
a collective (i.e. CMEA - RD) monetary unit, which would be convertible in the future




























































































into freely convertible currencies as well" —. Similar positions were confirmed by 
Ryzhkov himself at the following session of the CMEA, last summer 42. 
A. Aganbegyan clarifies the reason why such an approach is preferable. "Firstly, it will 
be possible to establish a convertible rouble in relation to the currencies of the socialist 
countries, made easier by their similar types of economies and the existing processes of 
economic integration" 42. More recently, similar arguments have also been advanced by 
K. Mikul’skii, who also advocates broader utilization of national currencies of CMEA 
countries, especially in direct links between enterprises, and the creation of a CMEA 
currency stock exchange, where such currencies can be exchanged 44.
On the other hand, many Soviet specialists seem to consider the attainment of 
convertibility within the CMEA a more difficult task than convertibility towards 
Western currencies 42. The main argument is that within CMEA the structure of prices 
is distorted to a different extent in different countries, and only after a harmonization of 
price structure will it be possible to consider such an hypothesis. They point to further 
difficulties in the lack of hard-currency reserves, in the divergent economic policies 
pursued by the various countries, and in the problem of commodity inconvertibility at 
domestic level.
However, even if many of the difficulties facing the Eastern European 
economies stem from the closed nature of the socialist "market", a process of 
polarization is undoubtedly taking place in international trade. In this respect, it is not 
clear why socialist countries should give up the opportunities derived from being part of 
a commercially (and in some respect politically) integrated area, particularly when many 
of them are attempting dramatic modifications of the system of planning and 
management. The CMEA, once tasks and lines of development have been redefined, 
may play a very important role in the process of opening up to the rest of the world, and 
may help to minimize the risks involved in such a profound process of transformation. It 
is equally clear, on the other hand, that the introduction of multilateralism and 
convertibility inside the CMEA and a far-reaching decentralization of the domestic 
economies, will not be enough. The process of transition to convertibility within the area 
must be accompanied by a equally gradual process of "opening up" to the rest of the 
world, and in particular to Western industrialized countries.
41. BBC Summary of World Broadcast EE/8699.15.10.1987.
42. Cf. Pravda. 6 July 1988, p.l.
42. Aganbegyan (1988), p.155.
44. Cf. Mikul'skii (1989).





























































































In the previous pages I have tried to outline a possible way in which a CPE, and 
more specifically the Soviet Union, may arrive at meaningful external convertibility of 
its domestic currency, and to point out the main obstacles to this process. It must be 
stressed once again, that the plausibility of the transition towards convertibility oudined 
above depends on four basic assumptions: the positive development of the domestic 
reform process; the gradual nature of the process of liberalization of commercial and 
financial operations; the possibility of slowing down the liberalization process itself, 
resorting to short-term forms of trade discrimination, without the risk of trade 
retaliation; and, finally, a cooperative attitude by Western countries, which may help to 
ease the transition process.
If these conditions are met, and I have tried to argue that they can be, the 
attainment of meaningful external convertibility of the Soviet rouble may well be 
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